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-In The SUPREME COURT
Of The STATE Of UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF DALLAS BEDFORD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN
AS D. B. LEWIS, DECEASED.
LUCILLE PARKER, J AC K
HElDT and ROBERT GASTON
Appellants.

Case No.
10719

vs.
ERNEST L. LEWIS,
Respondent.

PETITION

FOR

REHEARING

Rehearing of the above-entitled matter is prayed for
by the Respondent, Ernest L. Lewis.

BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Court should rehear this matter and reconsider
ih; decision rendered August 11, 1967, reversing the judgment d the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Millard County. It is respectfully submitted that said reversal
is erroneous because the trial court was vested with discret,on as to whom it should appoint as the personal representative of the estate and no showing was made that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting letters of
administration to the respondent.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS VESTED WITH
DISCRETION IN THE APPOINTMENT OF A
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF TH~ ESTATE
The law around which the contest in this case is centered is Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953, which provides:
If the person named in a will as executor for thirty
days after he has knowledge of the death of the testator
and that he is named as executor, fails to petition for
the probate of the will and for letters testamentary, he
may be held to have renounced his right to letters, and
the court may appoint any other competent person
administrator, unless good cause for the delay is shown.

Though the main opinion of the Court does not explicitly so state, repondent infers that the Court concurs wt:i
the respondent that the foregoing section applies equally
in ancillary and domiciliary adm ·nistraticn proceedingil.
The Court makes no contrary statement in its main opini.on and the dissenting opinion ably expounds this point.
It being thus assumed that the Court is well aware of, and
apparently in accord with, respondent's position that the
thirty day limitation in the code section quoted above is
applicable in this case, the point will not be further belabored.
In applying the foregoing code section to this case,
the following facts are crucially pertinent: Decedent died
on April 25, 1966. The appellants, who were named in
decedent's last will and testament as trustees, were aJI
informed of his death on April 26, 1966. The appellants
each had a copy of decedent's will and were aware of the
contents thereof on April 26, 1966. (Tr. 15, 69) By May
3, 1966, all of the appellants hnd filed petitions for appointment as executors of the estate of the decedent in

--the State of California. All of the appellants thought
they were intended to be named as executors in the said
will. (Tr. 4, 71) They knew that no one was actively opposing their appointment as executors and that no ob.: :'L·tj 0:1s were on file with the California Court. (Tr 4)
ln view of the foregoing facts, it is submitted that
the appellants were virtually certain they were the executors of the decedent's will. T11ey therefore had the same
rcsponsibilit.es as though the title "exe:::utors" had been
ar:p i.ccl to them in the will. Any doubt that could have
('cdsted in their minds as to the possibility of their being
nppointed executors by the dom:iciliary court could have
been little different than the doubt which would have existed in their minds had the will used the term "exe:utors."
The facts show that the appellants had every reason to
hc 1 eve and actually d:.J believe that the California court
would recognize them as executors of the decedent's will.
If a slight kernel of doubt existed in their minds, it could
hardly b2 considered sufficient ground upon which a
supreme court could base a reversal of a district court
decision. Yet, this Court has done exactly that. That
slight kernel of doubt is, in the main opinion of the Court.
t'ie hair's breadth between the affirming and reversing of
the district court deci.s:on.
Jn considering whether or not the appellants showed
good cause for their delay in petitioning for letters testamrntary in Utah, numerous factors must be taken into
account. The determination of whether good cause was
shown ought not to hang on the sheer thread of a minute
e1ement of doubt, but should be based upon the foundation of the preponderance of evidence.
It is submitted that several things can reasonably be
expected of persons who are virtually certain to be appointed as executors of an estate. Where the estate consisb; uf properties in several states, it is reasonable to expect the prospective executors to make inquiries about
the properties in all states. It is logical to expect them to
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request reports from the managers and custodians of the
properties in the various states. The appellants failed to
do this not only while their appointment was pending
but even after they were appointed by the California
court. The respondent was the manager of the property
in Utah and was temporarily in California and while ther2
made numerous efforts and requests to be allowed to familiarize the executors with the Utah property. The executors not only failed to take advantage of his knowledge,
but avoided him. (Tr. 31, 37, 53, 54, 86)
lt is to be expected that the executors, or prospe:tive executors, might Initiate inquiry about legal counsel
in other states where estate property might be located. In
this regard, they might be expected to inquire of the managers of the properties as to what legal counsel the decedent had used prior to his death, which counsel might be
expected to have valuable familiarity with the properties.
But the appellants init.ated no such inquiries. (Tr. 86)
lt would appear proper to expect the prospective
executors to inquire about the laws in the states where
estate properties were located. In this case, one of the
executors was a lawyer and the others were represented
by numerous lawyers. But nevertheless, an important statutory deadline in the State of Utah was allowed to sl"p by
without the executors apparent1y being cognizant of it.
Though the foregoing actions might reasonably have
been expected of the prospective executors prior to their
appointment and certainly should have been expected of
them immediately after their appointment, they took no
interest whatever in the properties in Utah and other
states until after the respondent informed them that he
was filing a petition for letters of administration in Utah.
Actually, the respondent would undoubtedly have had a
better case had he also been more dilatory, but he was
concerned about the good of the estate. It seems eminently
fair to infer that the appellants would have waited an
additional thirty days before applying for letters testa-
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mcntary in Utah had the respondent not awakened them
Ly taking action himself. This inference is made from the
tad that on July 6, 1966 (not on June 29 as stated in the
mam opinion of the Court) when hearing was held on the
ptitions of the parties hereto in the District Court of
Millard County, the filing of petitions for letters testamentary in the States of Idaho and Oregon was still
pending (Tr. 13)
The District Court considered all of these matters
and then found as follows:
As indicated above, the "trustees" knew as to their
being named in the Will and how they were named in
the Will on April 26, 1966, the day after decedent died,
if not in fact hefore. They did not petition this court
until June 13, 1966 which is not within the thirty day
period provided by Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953.
This court finds that they did not show good cause,
or in fact any cause for such delay, other than that they
didn't feel it was important as compared with other
mqtters, and that they were not concerned until after
they were informed of the J}etition by Ernest L. Lewis.
There was no showing that they were in any way prevented from petition ;ng this court, and in fact there
w'.ls t stimony that Mr. Ernest L. Lewis informed one
or more of them of the urgency for action in Utah, and
that they ignored such statements and appeared to
avoid contact with Mr. Lewis. (R. 102)
0

Lark of diligence and lack of interest in the Utah
properties were the obvious reasons for appellants' delay
in filing for letters testamentary in Utah. Lack of knowlPc!ge as to their being named as executors had nothing to
r~o with it--according to the finding of fact made by the
trial court. And the trial court's finding rests firmly upon
thP solid foundation of the preponderance of the evidence.
On thE other hand, the Supreme Court's reversal of the
distr ct court decision hangs by a flimsy thread of a minutP element of doubt.
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Moreover, "good cause shown" has not been such a
momentus factor in the prior decisions of this Court. In
applying the section of the code around which this case
revolves, this Court has stated in the case of In re Love's
Estate, 75 Utah 342, 353; 285 Pac. 299:
It may be conceded that, where the petition by the
party named as executor is filed in time, the court has
no discretion but to appoint the party named exe::utor
unless he is disqualifi€d by statute, but this court has
already committed itself to the doctrine that failure to
make timely application for letters testamentary leaves
it in the discretion of the court whether he appoint:;
the person having preferential right or some other competent person. (emphasis added)
The same reasoning was followed in the case of In 1·e
Slater's Estate, 55 Utah 252, 257; 184 Pac. 1017:
In any view that can be taken, therefore, appellant
had lost his preferential right to be appointed administrator, and even though he was still qualified to act, yet
his right to do so was no greater than the right of an.v
other competent person. The district court was thus
vested ... with "considerable discretion in the appointment of an administrator."
When the Supreme Court of this state has made the
unequivocal statement that it has committed itself to a doctrine of law, a lower court can be expected to rely upon
that commitment. In view of the prior holdings of the
Supreme Court, the trial judge felt secure in his knowledge
that appointment of a personal representative of the estate
was a matter clearly within his discretion. But now, the
Supreme Court has reversed itself without even giving
passing notice to its prior -:ryptic pronouncements of
legal doctrine to which it was "committed."
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DECISION SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Since the law clearly vested the lower court with discretion in this matter, its decision ought not to have been
reversed even though a majority of the Supreme Court
Justi.c:es, had they been in the pos:tion of the trial judge,
might have reached a different de:ision than was reached
by the trial court, unless it was clearly shown that the
trial court abused its discretion. This principle is supported by the great weight of legal authority. Respondent'~
rnum>el respectfully seeks the opportunity to give the
Court the benefit of citation to some of that authority and,
hopefully, more lucid argument on this point than he previously presented.
Jn commenting about a statute similar to the Utah
co"'e section about which t:iis case revolves, Bancroft, Prolmte Practice, 2nd Ed., Sec. 239 (note in supplement)
states as follows :
Such a statute as that described in the text is not
mandatory but discretionary and the action of the trial
court will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing
of an abuse of discret:on.
This doctrine has been applied by a California court
in the rnse of In re Deutsch's E.~tate, 156 Cal. App. 2d 57,
:118 P. 2d 847:
... (T) he provisions
U.C.A. 1953) are not
the action of the trial
absence of a showing

of Section 234 (similar to 75-3-4,
mandatory but dis:'retionary, and
court will not be disturbed in the
of abu8e of discretion.
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And the same doctrine was pronounced by this court
in the case of In re Slator's Estate, supra:
The district court having discretion in the matter, we
cannot reverse its ruling, unless it is made to appear
that it has abused that discretion to the prejudice of a
substantial right of the appellant.
No showing whatever was made that the district
court abused its discretion in appointing the respondent
as ancilliary administrator with w~ll annexed. On the contrary, it was shown that the respondent was the person
most familiar with the properties of the estate in Utah,
that he has been manager of :::aid properties for many
yean, that the decendent entrusted him with great responsibilities and that the district court was amply justified
in concluding that Ernest L. Lewis "has the best qualifications to serve of any person." (R.99)
The doctrine that a district court decision should not
be lightly disturbed is espcially applicable where it involves the appointment of a personal representative of an
estate. This is so be~ause the appointment is merely the
beginning of the matter, and not the end as is most usual
when a court decision is rendered. Consequently, the person appointed by the district court undertakes the performance of duties and it is greatly detrimental to the estate
for those duties to be passed over to other persons just
short of their completion--especia1ly in a situation where
those duties are extremely complex as they must necessarily be when they involve a large mining property.
The abandonment by the Court in this case of
prior sound doctrine that a lower court decision ought
to be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown
prives the law of reasonable security and advances
cause of legal chaos.

its
not
dethe
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CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court decision reversing the judgment
of the District Court of Millard County absolves the appellants from the duty of reasonable diligence because of a
flim<;y excuse. The district court weighed all of the evidence and based its decision on the preponderance. The
district court exercised sound discretion in appointing
_the respondent as the personal representative of the estate~
, -'J'Of abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court should rehear
--- and should not be reversed in the absence of a showing
amt rE.consider the matter and appropriately modify its
decision to affirm the decision rendered by the District
r,ourt of Millard County.
Respectfully submitted,
A. LEE PETERSEN
Attorney for Respondent

